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THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT PROBLEM
IN THE INTER WAR PERIOD
1. The history of international debt is the history of international 
finance. It is many centuries old and it is closely linked to 
international political history. The political element was seldom absent 
from international finance for the very simple reason that in many cases, 
and for a long time in the majority of cases, although creditors were 
mostly private financial houses, debtors were political authorities. The 
purely economic international loan incurred by the individual or firm in 
order to be used for productive purposes and dispensed by another firm in 
order to maximize profits, can be safely assigned to a minority shelf, with 
most episodes belonging either to the pre-1914 or post-1960 periods of 
world history.
The inter-war period is perhaps the high-noon of politicized 
inrternational finance. The variety of cases of political and economic 
interaction in the field of international debt is so great that one can be 
sure he can find in that period a precedent for whatever case of 
politicized international economics he is studying.
The years that follow the First World War could be read, for what 
international financial and monetary affairs are concerned, in the light of 
continuity with the pre-1914 period. The substitution of British hegemony 
with American hegemony in the world economy was taking shape in the decade 
before the war. The International gold standard was a fast degenerating 
international monetary regime before the war destroyed it. The European 
major powers had already managed to make their disturbing presence felt in 




























































































The international telegraph had already been introduced and 
transcontinental cables had been a reality for several decades. Financial 
markets had moved fast into a new bank-dominated structure in most 
countries, and direct financing had begun to replace the bill on London.
All these trends continued after the war. But the pace of movement 
increased and quantitative changes along the lines I have mentioned were so 
large after the war that quantity definitely became quality.
Moreover, for what concerns the art of government, the First World 
War marked a transition to a type of generalized control and of mass 
politics which was not present before and which was to characterize the age 
that followed, in which we live. What was defined as war-time controls, 
war-time political mobilization, by a public opinion which hoped they would 
recede and even disappear after the end of hostilities, was to become the 
mark of every day life in the following decades.
Referring ourselves back to mercantilism would be no help, if we try 
to understand the transformation of the art of government during and after 
the First World War. Governments had never abandoned mercantilism. As the 
National Monetary Commission found, perhaps to its surprise, when asking 
the directors of the Bank of England on the operation of Bank Rate 
Mechanism, those supposed upholders of the highest form of laissez-faire 
raised bank rate when reserves fell but did not lower it when they rose.
They were, like every other monetary authority of the day, convinced 
believers in the Bagehot opinion that money would not manage itse lf.1 
Still, proving the mercantilist spirit of even the high priests of 




























































































control introduced by countries to fight total war was in any way 
comparable to what had been experienced before. And mobilizing the masses 
to fight total war proved such a successful experiment that politicians 
found it impossible to revert to the easy world of pre-war parliamentary 
usage. A new rationality in political policy-making and economic 
policy-making began to emerge, which would dismay Keynes, one of its 
earliest chroniclers, but would not go away even after he exorcized it in 
the fulminations of "The Economic Consequences of the Peace."2
2. It was, in fact, with the reparations to be exacted from the 
vanquished nations and in particular from Germany, that the stage of 
inter-war international finance was set. This is a basic element that must 
never be forgotten. In the whole period, international financial 
transactions, even those involving countries not in the least involved with 
reparations, were powerfully influenced by the reparation problem.
Reparations set the agenda for the next twenty years, and gave the whole 
period the character of high politization, precarious balance, or open 
crisis which students of international finance invariably detect and remark 
upon.
Before the first world war individuals, firms and governments had 
defaulted on their debts. They had done so quite often, leaving their 
domestic or international creditors in the lurch. But debts had never been 
considered deprived of legal or moral legitimacy. After the 1870 defeat, 
the French had paid the huge sum imposed by the victorious Prussians.3 They 
now expected the Germans would do the same. Recent evidence unearthed in 




























































































reparations obligations as sanctioned by legal legitimacy for a variety of 
reasons, and that several among the Allies, in particular the British and 
above all the Americans, shared their conviction, and saw reparations as a 
big public relations exercise to convince public opinion in the victorious 
countries that the conclusion of an armistice with Germany did not mean 
millions of people had fought and died for nothing. The Germans entered, 
as a result, a heavy financial obligation with the profound conviction that 
they would not be held to it by the other side. And some of their 
creditors shared their view, partially or totally. As was patronizingly 
indicated by "well informed circles" when Keynes' book came out and took 
the world by storm, the poor economist was taking the issue too seriously. 
The Germans, of course, would not be asked to pay the exorbitant sums 
specified at Versailles. It was all necessary to rally public opinion 
around the Peace Treaty.^
Having taken the devil out of the bottle, however, proved to be much 
easier than putting it back into it. Once the sums specified in the Peace 
Treaty were totaled up, they began to be counted upon to offset the huge 
debts the allies had incurred to fight the war. These were real debts, 
sanctioned by traditional legal procedures, and Britain and the United 
States let it be clearly known they expected them to be repaid.
It is very difficult not to understand the bitter feelings the 
asymmetrical behavior of Britain and the United States aroused in countries 
like France and Italy. They were asked to honor their war debts while at 
the same time a deal seemed to have been concluded over their heads by 




























































































exhorbitant. The fact, which Keynes pointed out so eloquently, that 
Germany would be potentially unable to honor reparations, could only 
contribute to inflame French and Italian opinion further as the possibility 
to offset their own debts was shown to have existed only on the parchment 
of the Peace Treaty.
The reparation issue thus introduced into post-war international 
finance a strong element of illegality which had not existed before 1916.
It introduced, mainly because of the ill-considered actions of Woodrow 
Wilson and David Lloyd George, the legitimacy of repudiation and default as 
a means of legitimate international economic policy-making. Countries had 
defaulted before, but the reparation issue introduced the feeling that 
default on foreign loans had become a legitimate instrument of the art of 
government.
This is not the place to inquire why the English and American 
statesmen opened this Pandora's box. Arno Mayer has convincingly written 
that they did so in an attempt to roll back or at least contain, the Soviet 
Revolution.^ What is relevant for our purposes is the legitimation of 
financial illegality and irresponsibility it induced.
Saddled with the objectively exorbitant sums the Peace Treaty 
obliged them to pay, the German political and economic authorities, who had 
been led to believe they would not be called upon to honor them, responded 
by flooding Europe with an avalanche of Mark-notes, which the credulous 
European middle classes, still convinced that the Mark would be stabilized
i
at its pre-war level, happily accepted in payment for goods and services or 




























































































on the subject of inter-war international finance, while much space is 
dedicated to the "irresponsibility" of the French monetary authorities, who 
responded in kind by maneuvering their foreign exchange balances between 
the various financial centers to further French foreign policy objectives, 
instead of cooperating with the supposedly "apolitical" actions of the 
British and American monetary authorities.^
Nor has the idea that the great German inflation was a deliberate 
policy strategy completely conquered the economic historians of this 
period, although enough abundant archival evidence has been found to 
validate it. Its sudden stop, however, and the equally sudden restoration 
of monetary order which followed, ought to have showed economists the light 
a long time ago.
3. In spite of Arno Mayer's interpretation of British and America's 
motives with reference to the armistice and the Peace Treaty, one of the 
most glaring differences between the inter-war period and the decades 
following the Second World War is the non-existence, in the inter-war 
years, of an all encompassing military alliance against a perceived enemy, 
like the post-war NATO alliance. In the inter-war years, as the German 
behavior with respect to reparations and inflation, abetted by some of the 
allies, legitimized international illegality, the Western countries began 
to consider international financial policy as an extension of foreign 
policy in a way they had not done before, and the scope of the policy would 
be " £  tout izimout" to repeat' an expression coined by General de Gaulle's 
strategists. This has not happened after the second world war. The 




























































































from contemplating and realizing policies, with respect to international 
finance, which would be inspired by the logic of zero-sum games, of static 
power redistribution. This is perhaps too marked a distinction, as some 
policies, like the French policies with respect to gold, the U.S. unpegging 
of the dollar in 1971, Japan's hurried disposal of huge dollar reserves 
soon after, could be considered as being inspired by a non-cooperative 
zero-sum games philosophy. More examples could be provided. However, the 
fact of being all in the same strategic camp has meant that, on the whole, 
Western countries have behaved in a basically cooperative fashion for what 
concerns the maintenance of some semblance of international financial 
order. The same cannot be said of the behavior of the same countries in 
the inter-war period. Real-politik of the most traditional type seems to 
have triumphed in the international financial relations of those two 
decades, and to have informed even some episodes which could be interpreted 
as attempts at cooperative behavior. The return on the part of the major 
countries, followed by a large number of other ones, to the gold standard, 
is one of these episodes.
If we look at the chain of events which led to the British return to 
the gold standard, we can derive from it the superficial conclusion that a 
high level of cooperation among British and American central bankers 
rendered the British return to gold possible. But the wealth of research 
that this episode has elicited does not allow us to reach that conclusion.
On the contrary, the return to gold can be seen as an important British
!
defeat in the open fight for international financial supremacy American 




























































































bloc as they did in the 1920s) engaged during and after the First World 
War.7
Britain's postwar policy objective after the end of hostilities had 
been to extend the pre-war transformation/ of the international gold 
standard into a gold exchange standard. And, under heavy British pressure, 
the Genoa Conference, in 1922, was concluded with such a recommendation. 
The philosophy which inspired the British policy stance was clear. Even in 
the last decade before the war, the Bank of England had experienced a 
continuous pressure on its gold reserve, and the matter of reserves had 
become an extremely divisive issue in British financial circles. I have 
shown elsewhere how Britain's giant banks had threatened to go their own 
way and establish a cooperative gold fund, separate from the Bank of 
England's reserve, which they considered far too low to support the huge 
pyramid of credit centered on London.^ Stop gap measures to solve the 
problem had been found, in the last pre-war decade, by using India's export 
surplus. Rather than being transformed into gold, the latter was held in 
sterling balances, earning an interest. In his book on Indian currency and 
finance, Keynes had theorized this temporary expedient into a new 
international monetary system, and hailed it as the way of the future. But 
a major weakness of the "new system" had not escaped the attention of an 
early reviewer of Keynes' book, Gustavo del Vecchio. He had noticed that 
the pre-war experience with the gold exchange standard had involved 
colonial territories, not sovereign countries, and that the possibiity of 
political management of the foreign exchange balances had not been 





























































































Events in the 1920s were to prove Del Vecchio's clairvoyance only too 
accurately. It would be, however, too superficial to think that the 
British had not adverted to the danger. Theirs was a policy of despair, as 
they knew a pure gold standard could not ;be managed from London. The Bank 
of England had never controlled the international gold market by the power 
of a formally owned stock. It had controlled it through the management of 
South African gold supplies and by compelling the India office to invest 
the Indian trade surplus in sterling balances. After the war those two 
instruments were both gone. As it would be unthinkable that the Bank could 
build up a sufficient buffer stock of gold, keeping a free gold market in 
London was clearly impossible, while it would be quite possible that the 
United States, who had ended the war with a huge gold stock, would succeed 
London as manager of the gold standard, and that the dollar would replace 
sterling as the world's premier store of value currency.
Inherent in the British reasoning was, of course, a marked pessimism 
on the functioning of bank rate as an international monetary policy 
instrument. This went against the conclusions of the Cunliffe Committee, 
but not against the considerations the Cunliffe Committee had made on how 
bank rate operated. It was exactly because bank rate was seen by the 
committee as operating through employment and output changes that the 
British authorities attempted not to go back to a gold standard where the 
slimness of the Bank of England's reserve would involve a semi-permanent 
deflation of the British economy through punitive bank rate levels. They 
thus tried the gold exchange standard card as a last resort. While the 




























































































the main European countries went along with it, the United States, who was 
on the gold standard since 1919, embarked upon a policy to extend that 
system to as many countries as possible. Through the unofficial good works 
of Edwin Kemmerer, the "Princeton Money; Doctor," the gold standard was 
adopted by several Latin American countries. But the really crucial 
victory was obtained when, upon Kemmerer's advice, the Union of South 
Africa rejected sterling and adopted the gold standard.^
After that England had no choice but to play the game according to 
the new rules. It was the only chance she had not to decline to second 
rank financial power. Given her social structure, and the structure of her 
foreign trade, the possibility that Britain would not follow the course she 
did was never really there. As to the parity, it is quite reasonable that 
Britain's authorities had foremost in their minds the fact that a lower 
parity would mean that the world's banker would be partially defaulting on 
its sterling debts. And that would certainly be seen as another plus in 
favor of New York and of do liar-dominated international transactions.
Once we become convinced that Britain and the United States were 
fighting for the same cake, the international financial history of the 
inter-war period becomes much easier to understand. The fatal mistake is 
to interpret it with the values of the 1950s or 1960s. We must realize 
that the inter-war years, and in particular the 1920s, were the period when 
the transition from the sterling standard to the dollar standard was made. 
And it was not an abdication, but a fight to the finish, with no holds
i
barred, which involved all levels of political activity and probably 





























































































4. The history of international debts in the inter-war period, now that 
the backdrop of international finance is in place, can be seen as an 
important part in the transition from a sterling-dominated to a dollar- 
dominated international finance. '
We have already commented on reparations, the most blatantly 
politicized part of the inter-war international finance. It is now time to 
deal with the other most important episode of inter-war international 
finance, the huge flood of American investments which invaded the world in 
the 1920s and abruptly receded at the end of the decade.
The surge of American international investment, and of international 
loans in particular, is a phenomenon usually approached by focusing on the 
demand side of it. Students of the problem have thus focused on the 
borrowers, who they were, what they did with the money, why they defaulted. 
This is in accordance with recent monetary theory, which tends to analyze 
the demand for money much more than the conditions attendant upon its 
supply.
But the surge of American foreign lending was so abrupt, so 
undiscriminating, so well circumscribed in time that it is impossible not 
to switch the analytical focus from the debtors to the lenders. An inquiry 
into the census of American foreign lending is rendered easier by the 
recent output of research on the American credit market in the inter-war 
years.
In order to dispel any lingering doubts that focusing on American 
foreign lending might be biased and exaggerated it is useful to analyze the 




























































































France and Germany, and more recently the United States, had been engaged 
in international lending, international bond flotations had been an 
activity centered in the City of London and performed in sterling. It had 
been performed through underwriting and issuing houses which were 
autonomous from the great English clearing banks. Experience in the issue 
of foreign bonds had been accumulated by the leading English merchant banks 
in the course of more than a century. Foreign bond issues had come in 
great spates, in cycles crowned by booms and busts. After the Baring 
crisis, however, the foreign bond market had grown to a size which would 
not be regained after the war. The amount of money annually accruing to 
Britain in the form of interest and the total new foreign capital issues as 
a percentage of British domestic investment would never be equalled again.
Though the apolitical nature of pre-war British foreign lending has 
been somewhat exaggerated, it is still true that, by comparison with French 
and German pre-war lending, British lending was motivated by and large by 
private profit maximization, and that very few overt and even covert 
strings were attached to it, even for what concerns the tying of lending to 
purchases of British-made capital goods. In fact, it can be said that in 
order to maintain its foreign lending activities on the massive scale they 
had reached, the City was able to impose upon the rest of the country a 
monetary policy of semi-permanent deflation, which had, already before the 
war, seriously undermined Britain's status as a first class international 
producer and exporter. Preference for higher yielding foreign bonds on the
i
part of British finance and the British public had gone to the detriment of 




























































































lagging behind Germany and the Unted States in the modern sectors of 
industry, where the "second industrial revolution" was taking place.
After the war, with the disappearance of the captive Indian trade 
surplus, with the "liberation" of the South-' African monetary system, and 
the liquidation of British foreign assets to pay for the war effort, it was 
evident that London's role in international lending would be seriously 
impaired. As to Germany and France, an even more pessimistic forecast 
could be made about their ability to reqcquire their pre-war positions in 
international lending.
Those who have focused on the demand side of the foreign lending 
problem have, therefore, been partially justified in explaining the surge 
of American lending by the pressure of the whole world demand for credit on 
the U.S. financial system. Having amassed huge gold reserves, and in the 
forced absence of traditional pre-war lenders, it seemed inevitable that 
the U.S. would step into this activity, so to speak, by general request.
It would be simplistic, however, to hold such an automatic, 
deterministic, view of the international adjustment process. After all, when 
in the 1970s the OPEC countries were suddenly transformed into the world's 
largest savers, this did not magically transform them into the world's 
bankers. Bankers and financiers are, after all, called financial 
intermediaries because they work with their capital but especially with 
other people's capital. Had the United States, as was the case with the 
OPEC countries, not possessed a financial system that could rise to the
i
challenge, inter-war financial history would have been written in a very 



























































































drastically reduced by the war did not mean that the huge apparatus of the 
City of London had been destroyed. On the contrary, it was still there, 
ready, like any other industrial sector which has not seen its capacity 
reduced, to regain its former output levels. The fight was therefore 
between London, which had the capacity, and New York, which had the "raw 
material" and was confident it could also build up its productive capacity.
A very important favorable element on New York's side was represented 
by the world's permanent hunger for dollars, which had developed in the war 
years. The United States had, in those five years, become the world's 
emporium. It had supplied belligerent as well as neutral countries with 
primary commodities, intermediate products and manufactures. Primary many 
producers like the Latin American countries and manufacture exporters like 
Japan had also shared in the bonanza, but only the U.S. was self-sufficient 
in raw-materials and manufacturers. As had been the case with Britian in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, the Untied States had become 
everybody's supplier. A great "dollar gap" had thus developed, making the 
dollar the most sought after currency in the world. The dollar having 
risen to challenge sterling as the most important trading currency, it was 
up to the American credit system to facilitate its international use. The 
task was to intermediate between American savers who had profited from the 
war bonanza and foreign borrowers who needed finance for the most various 
purposes.
Here again a comparison with nineteenth-century Britain is useful.
The great British foreign lending experience crucially depended on the rise 




























































































to a great number of foreign savers, it is undoubted that the bulk of their 
sales went to British savers. It was therefore a largely domestic market,
The situation was very similar in the United States after the war.
The potential ultimate lenders were American middle class families, who 
would reckon their lending in their own national currency. Again, it was a 
domestic market with foreign borrowers.^
Still, if anybody in 1913 had ventured to offer a scenario where the 
U.S. financial system would replace London as the main intermediary in the 
issue of foreign bonds, he would have been greeted with disbelief. And the 
disbelief would have been well founded, on a static view of the 
"technology" of international finance. New York had none of the facilities 
which constituted the pre-war network of production of international 
financial assets and liabilities. It was utterly dependent on London for 
the finance of American foreign trade. It had no issuing houses, no 
commodities markets, no practice with bills of exchange. It did not even 
have a central bank. And the law did not allow American banks to establish 
branches abroad.
But all this reasoning assumed a "static" technology for the 
"production" of foreign bonds. The secret of the large New York banks' 
astonishing success in floating huge amounts of foreign bonds is that they 
treated them exactly as if they had been domestic bonds.
But, granted that this was so, the traditional "technology" 
postulated an international financial center, whose main features recalled
i
more a mercantile past than an industrial future. The City of London was, 




























































































resemblant of one in Lloyd's or in the Commodities Exchanges, and almost 
completely based on specialization and pluralism, and united by the 
pervasive class homogeneity a pluricentennial continuous interchange had 
permitted. The New York banks' success in managing the huge inter-war 
foreign lending depended fundamentally on their refusal to ape London. The 
British example had been forced upon them by the Gold Standard Act of 1900 
and by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The latter, in particular, had as 
one of its fundamental propositions that a money market ought to be built 
on British-type bills of exchange. This never happened. Bills of exchange 
had been on the retreat as an instrument of domestic finance even in 
England. What the New York large banks marched decisively towards was the 
concept of the Universal Bank or, in the local banks jargon, the "financial 
supermarket."
In fact, what the New York banks did was to cut through the whole 
structure of British type finance, to intermediate, in only one step, 
between the ultimate lenders and the ultimate borrowers.
Thus, they extended the potential foreign bond markets lending 
clientele by substituting a non-existent international financial center, 
which could not be created in New York in the short-run, with a firm-based 
structure to link demand and supply. In the language of Oliver Williamson, 
they used hierarchies rather than markets in the sale of foreign bonds as 
well as in other international, and domestic financial activ ities.^
Substantial help in this activity came to them from their recent 
experience as salesmen of American government war bonds. It is in fact 




























































































purpose was the same they used to reserve foreign bonds. And it has been 
suggested that foreign bonds were the logical follow-up of the government 
bonds activity, as they would increase the productivity of an otherwise 
half employed sales force, after governmerit bonds issues dried up .^
For the banks, foreign bonds issues were also a highly profitable 
business. This was highlighted in an early book by Robert Kuczynski.^ But 
the availability of a sales force, well-tried by government bonds sales, 
and the high profits to be reaped in foreign bonds sales would not be 
enough to explain the incredible fervor with which the large New York banks 
solicited new issues from all kinds of prospective foreign borrowers and 
sold them to American middle class savers. A good part of the explanation 
for that fervor must be found in the dearth of alternative sectors of 
activity open to the large New York banks in the 1920s. It has been 
authoritatively suggested that in the 1920s a profound revolution took 
place in American corporate finance. Firms experienced a new abundance of 
funds and began a massive practice of trade credit and discount sales. New 
equity issues were preferred to bank loans.^
The large New York banks, which had relied on wholesale banking also 
expected a rapid falling off of correspondent balances, which had 
flourished under the pre-war national banking system. They had been held 
responsible for the crisis of 1907, as they were considered the main 
element of the American banking system's structural instability. The 
Federal Reserve Act had divised a new system under which banks would
i
keep their reserves at Federal Reserve Banks, rather than in the form of 




























































































For these reasons, the New York large banks foresaw a series of lean 
years in wholesale and industrial banking, and jumped on the new bandwagon 
of retail banking. They were, as I said above, induced to do so by the 
rise of the American middle class, and by -the financial affluence which 
went with it. These new financially affluent people had recently acquired 
savings which they had to dispose of. The banks began by selling them war 
bonds. After those dried out, they offered them foreign bonds.
The potential market proved to be so large, and so eager, that the 
banks had actually to solicit loans from all kinds of foreign borrowers.
The image of American banks' representatives sitting at the doorstep of 
public authorities all over the world, waiting to be received to offer them 
loans, has been evoked so often that it is not necessary to do it again.
It is perhaps a worn, but still a realistic image. It was a phenomenon 
that had not happened before, and would not happen again for another fifty 
years.
An equally worn, and still realistic image is that evoked in the 
Hearings on the Sales of Foreign Securities Inquiry the Congress of the 
United States set up in the wake of the disastrous defaults of a great 
number of those bonds.^  it is the image of embezzlement and graft which 
these huge sums of money, so liberally disguised, had caused in the 
receiving countries, and of the wasteful purposes to which much of the 
money had been offered. Again, the phenomenon had not been known to have 
occurred on such a scale before and it will take another 50 years before it
i
would occur again.
What was the political aspect of this story, which seems to have been 
unfolding so far at the sign of profit maximization and extension of the 




























































































It is perhaps worth noting, first of all, that the dynamic behavior 
of the large New York banks could have not been sustained for so long had 
the Federal Reserve Act not lowered substantially the reserve requirements 
of the U.S. banking system.
And the promotion of foreign loans would have been very difficult had 
the U.S. authorities not actively fostered the return, on the part of a 
large number of countries, to convertibility under the gold standard.
Finally, the U.S. authorities, perhaps unwillingly, helped to allay 
the American savers' fears of lending to unknown foreign borrowers by 
vetting alj_ foreign bonds issues in the United States through a specially 
constructed section of the Department of State. The fact that this vetting 
only concerned the political appropriateness of the proposed loans was not 
widely publicized, and the State Department's approval was quite naturally 
seen as extending to the financial qualities of the transaction.17
It is easy to see how some of the reasons that help to explain the 
U.S. banks' astonishing success in peddling foreign loans to the American 
public were also the reasons for the early and disastrous demise of the 
experiment.
The U.S. banks were behaving as if they were concerned with purely 
domestic operations and were pushed excesses by the competitive structure 
of the banking industry in the 1920s and the lack of alternative 
investments. In the frenzied atmosphere of the American 1920s, it is very 
easy, and very appealing, to apply George Akerlof's theory of asymmetrical 
information to the foreign bonds market.! ̂  The banks had very imperfect 




























































































almost no knowledge of the borrowers' financial conditions. They trusted 
the banks and the State Department. In such a situation it would have been 
essential that no defaults be allowed to occur, because the finding of one 
"lemon" would have caused the whole market to contract disastrously. But 
the competitive structure of the American banking industry in the 1920s did 
not make this type of cooperative behavior possible. Had the large banks 
colluded, they definitely would have not been able to build up such a huge 
operation in such a short time.
For the same reasons it would have been impossible for the large 
banks not to shift their competitive race to the Stock Exchange. When the 
Wall Street boom began, the banks started to promote the retail sales of 
common stock to the same people they had sold foreign bonds hitherto. But 
the attraction of American shares was much greater, as the new middle class 
could see its paper profits grow at a pace which was not thinkable with 
foreign bonds.
The disastrous end of the great foreign bond adventure thus came when 
the American public changed the mix of its portfolio, away from bonds and 
into shares. This would-have not necessarily meant trouble had the great 
majority of foreign borrowers not been pushed by the U.S. banks' dynamic 
behavior, into a state of indebtedness where new loans were needed just to 
service the old ones.19 Since new money was not forthcoming, defaults were
i
inevitable. And, inevitably they occurred. It has been maintained, with 
satisfactory evidence, that, since foreign loans prices and interest rates 
reflected some widely respected index of risk, ultimate lenders had been 




























































































they would be if they had stuck to U.S. government paper.20 However, the 
spread between the riskiest and the safest loans was not very large. And 
it is not clear how an interest rate differential would represent a 
differential default risk. It would, if it represented anything, represent 
a differential illiquidity risk.
If the differential interest rates represent only an illiquidity 
risk, the borrower has insufficient information about the possibility of 
default. Against his natural reactions when one default occurs and he 
tries to protect himself by dumping all sorts of foreign bonds, banks 
should provide by not letting defaults occur or by providing for the 
security of borrowers with some mutual assistance scheme if they did. 
Central banks could be drafted to run such schemes.
Nothing of the sort was done in the late 1920s. The large banks did 
not realize what could be the reactions of a public they had initiated to 
foreign bonds and quoted shares when the possibility of default, with 
consequent write-off for the loans, or of precipitous fall, with equally 
ruinous losses, for the shares, became realistic.
As I said above, however, the conditions which permitted the meteoric 
rise of foreign bond sales in America were the same which caused their 
sudden and precipitous fall. When the foreign bond market dried up in the 
U.S., as the public switched to Wall Street, U.S. large banks tried to keep 
their main borrowers afloat by short-term loans. This was particularly 
true of Germany, which was also by far the main borrower in the U.S. But 
very little could be alone to stem the outflow. Matters were made much 




























































































whole of 1928 and 1929 caused the amassing of huge foreign balances in New 
York, mostly at short term. The fear that those balances might be 
withdrawn induced the authorities to push rates even higher and finally 
this killed the already tottering stock exchange boom and ushered in the 
Depression.
This is not the place to revive the old debate about who was 
responsible for the Depression. Here it is only relevant to say that 
having entrusted the recycling mechanism to a credit system in constant 
turmoil, as the American then was, meant that fast multiplication was 
possible but also that fast de-multiplication was equally possible. Both 
occurred. The world was thus spared a Depression in the 1920s, and the day 
of reckoning was delayed for at least ten years. But it finally arrived.
Could the accumulation of the credit superstructure built in the 1920s have 
occurred at a less distressingly fast rate? Could the world have been 
spared the sudden quasi-cessation of foreign trade which made the default 
of many foreign borrowers, good or bad, necessary?
This is a problem of counterfactual history for which I have little 
taste. Some lessons however, can be drawn from the international debt 
experience of the inter-war years. First I would remark on the 
destructiveness of non-cooperative behavior among the Western countries.
Once the fatal mistakes of the Peace Treaty had been made and the Wartime 
Alliance had been dissolved, international financial policy became 
indissolubly linked to foreign policy. It was then too late to promote 
real cooperation, and what goes under the name of "Central Bank" 




























































































anything like what goes under the same name in the post 1945 world.
Central bankers met with one another in the spirit of camaderie which is 
typical of people performing the same functions, but the same could be said 
of the officers who had been killing one another in the First, and would do 
the same in the Second World War. It was, after all, the Soviet Army which 
trained and re-equipped the German Army in the inter-war period.21
A second consideration worth making is that there is a marked 
difference between the default of Germany and that of other peripheral 
borrowers, like the South American countries.
Germany's default was brought about by the drying up of American 
long-term lending much less than by the impossibility of maintaining the 
gold standard in spite of massive destabilising short-term capital 
movements. J.M. Keynes and H.D. White were then right when they attributed 
to short term capital movements the role of Chief Villain in the inter-war 
international monetary play, and tried to exorcise them in the post-war 
international monetary order they designed.22
The German stand-still agreements were thus the consequence of the 
speculative excesses of short term finance. Peripheral countries, on the 
contrary, defaulted when international trade contracted as ruinously as it 
did after 1929 and their exports accordingly precipitated to depths which 
could not possibly allow them to service, let alone repay, their debt.
It is equally important to note that, by its skillful manipulation of 
the debt problem, Germany managed, in the 1930s, to repudiate most of the 
debt and even to build on blocked balances a network of bilateral trade 



























































































The Latin American countries had much worse luck. They were the 
principal victims of the Johnson Amendment and they ended up re-paying much 
more than it is generally believed.
Again we are confronted with an asymmetrical reality. The largest 
borrower, being one of the most industrialized and, on the whole, best run 
countries of the period, is always in a position to control its own destiny 
and those of many other countries, lenders as well as borrowers. It can 
turn events into policies.
Peripheral countries, on the contrary, remain at the receiving end.
They are flooded with money when the tide is high, and they cannot do 
anything when the tide ebbs. Germany could turn to autarky and Britain to 
imperial preference. The U.S. retreated into its huge market and Japan 
resorted to "co-prosperity" in Asia. But the Latin American countries 
could either default on their debts and embark upon some 
import-substitution schemes or adopt, like Argentina, savage deflation in 
order not to default. Their lower classes thus bore most of the brunt of 
both schemes, when the financial merry-go-round stopped.
Of some interest, when compared with the present international debt 
problem, is the fact that a large part of international debt was 
constituted by long term bonds. This should not be exaggerated as a 
difference because there was a very large quantity of short-term (under 
five years) bank credit and an also very large quantity of inter-bank 
credit.
Compared to the Euro-bond market, pre-war bond issues undeniably 




























































































fact that the prevalence of bonds meant that there were literally millions 
of foreign bond holders made the international financial market more 
unstable is debatable. It should be, first of all, noted that it is 
impossible for lenders to do anything about default. Default is, 
technically, a decision of the borrower, and it has such dire consequences 
for lenders to sovereign debtors that the former, in the case of sovereign 
loans, tries everything it can to prevent it from happening. Certainly, in 
the case of individuals, if their foreign loans are defaulted, they just 
incur a loss. If the lenders are banks, however, or other corporate firms 
default can easily have direct multiplicative effects on the financial 
system. Unlike individuals, however, banks being more "discrete" entities 
than individuals, they can get together much more easily, and have, in 
principle, the powers, if they agree, to stave off default indefinitely by 
rescheduling. Bonds, however, much more easily than loans, can be sold on 
secondary markets, even if they are defaulted. Even if they are formally 
repudiated by the governments that have incurred them, they can be 
purchased, at very low prices in the expectation that governments may 
change and decide to honor their debts.2^
Off-loading loans is much more difficult, because there is much less 
experience with secondary markets for them, and because they tend to be of 
much shorter life than bonds (though this may not necessarily be so, in 
practice it is so).
On the assumption that foreign bonds had not been used as collateral 
for domestic credit, the solution of the international debt problem in the 




























































































borrowing country or agency could be secured, in the the sense that it 
would not repudiate its bonds. That is, however, exactly what Germany did 
with Hitler's accession to power.
A couple of more general considerations are also in order. On the 
assumption that it was the disastrous effect of the slump in raw material 
and primary commodities prices that induced default in primary producing 
countries, all those countries ought to have defaulted. As it turned out, 
none of the British dominions did. Nor did Argentina, where Britain had a 
capital stake much larger than that of the U.S. and British finance was 
very influential on the banking system. Where dollar bonds prevailed, as 
in Germany and especially in South America, defaults generally occurred. 
This differential behavior is further evidence of the danger inherent in 
the vagaries of U.S. finance and also of the greater stability of 
British-controlled or influenced financial systems, like those of the 
Dominions and Argentina. Argentina was the only Latin American country 
which did not default.25
From the more political point of view, it can be said that when the 
disastrous fall in foreign revenues occurred because of the slump in 
prices, and of the withdrawal of foreign balances, the democratic 
governments in power in various countries reacted by deflating their 
economies, and by trying to re-negotiate the foreign debt. The resultant 
failures and unemployment, however, soon induced revolution and the 
revolutionary governments' first action was almost invariably a 
repudiation, either outright or in stages, of foreign debt.
Default can be thus inversely connected to political stability, as 




























































































maintained where the borrowers had a well organized financial and fiscal 
system and faced lenders, like the British, with greater experience of 
foreign lending.26 This can be seen by the analysis of successful 
conversion operations conducted in the 1930s. Most of them involved 
Dominions or European countries. Most of them took place in London. Very 
few conversions were possible in New York. Of course the Johnson Act 
approved by Roosevelt on April 13, 1934, made conversions difficult, as it 
prohibited loans to foreign governments in default on their debts to the 
U.S. government. It was hoped, when the act was passed, that it would put 
























































































































































































See U.S. Monetary Commission: Interviews on Banking, Publications 
of the N.M.C.I., Washington, 1910, p. 26.
/
2 Keynes' own candor, however, has been seriously doubted by
S. Schucker, who has done extensive archival research in Germany. See his 
review of Keynes's works in Journal of Economic Literature, 1980.
3 On French reparations to Germany after the Franco-German War of 
1870, see the careful compilation made by C.P. Kindleberger in his 
Financial History of Europe, London, 1984.
 ̂ On the German attitude to reparations, see Keynes's Collected 
Writings, Vol. XVII, Activities 1920-22, London, 1977 and S. Schucker, The 
End of French Predominance in Europe, Chapel Hill, 1976. Also E.W. Bennett, 
Germany and the Diplmacy of Financial Crisis, Cambridge, Mass., 1972.
 ̂ See, Arno Mayer's classic, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace Making, 
New York, 1967.
6 The best known vindication of French motives is Etienne Mantoux, The 
Carthaginian Peace, New York, 1952. See also, S. Schucker, op. cit.
7 See Frank Costigliola, "Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 
1920s," in Journal of Economic History, 1977. Also the relevant parts in 
Kindleberger, op. cit., for further references.




























































































9 Gustavo del Vecchio's review of Keynes' book is in Giornale degli 
Economisti, 1914.
10 Although South Africa went officially on the Gold Standard after 
Britain, E. Kemmerer and G. Vissering submitted a report commissioned by 
the Hertzog Government, advocating South Africa's return to gold on January 
8, 1925. This crucial episode is well treated in B.R. Dalgaard, South 
Africa's Impact on Britain's Return to Gold, New York, 1981. It is also 
dealt with in Costigliola, op.cit.
11 For an inquiry on who were the ultimate lenders of foreign dollar 
bonds, see, D.E. Morrow, "Who Buys Foreign Bonds?," Foreign Affairs, Jan. 
1927.
12 On the micro and macroeconomic reasons for the U.S. large banks' 
ability to expand their international operations in the inter-war period, 
much can be learned from Eugene N. White's excellent book, The Regulation 
and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900-1929, Princeton, 1981. I 
have had the privilege of also seeing White's unpublished paper "Banking 
Innovation in the 1920s," which he presented at the Business History 
Conference at Hartford, in March, 1984. White's findings coincide with 
those of Thomas Huertas and H. van B. Cleveland, whose History of City 
Bank I have been fortunate to read in its pre-publication edition.
13 This view is confirmed by White and Huertas-Cleveland. It was
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I** R. Kuczynski, Bankers' Profits from German Loans, Washington, 1932.
1  ̂ This view is based on White and Huertas-Cleveland, op. cit.
16 The competitive excesses of U.S; banks in pushing loans on to 
foreign governments local authorities and corporations, and the often 
wasteful utilization of the proceeds, are well described in the Hearings 
before the Committee on Finance, Sales of Foreign Securities, U.S. Senate,
72nd Congress, pursuant Res. no. 19, Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1932.
This was brought out forcefully by several of the witnesses called 
before the aforementioned Senate Committee. The State Department's role is 
also analyzed in J .  Madden, M. Nadler, H. Sauvain, America's Experience as 
a Creditor Nation, New York, 1937.
18 See, George Akerlof, "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism," in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970. In 
their paper, "The Political Economy of Internatinal Lending," presented at
the CATO Conference on "World Debt and Monetary Order," P. De Grauve and 
M. Fratianni also use Akerlof's paper, but rather differently from the way 
I do here.
19 However, this system had been praised as late as 1928 by
George P. Auld, Accountant General of the Reparation Commission, with the 
following words: <
"The dollar exchange created by the new loans takes care of the old loans 




























































































is dangerous to the U.S. But I have yet to hear any sensible reason 
advanced why it is dangerous and why it cannot go on indefinitely to levels 
scarcely yet dreamed of... So long as the debtor countries have no export 
surplus, they will be in the market for new foreign loans, and the debts 
will be paid by new loans." See G.P. Auld, The Mythical Transfer Problem, 
The National Foreign Trade Council, N.Y., 192S, p. 13. Quoted by Madden, 
Nadler, Sauvain, op. c it., p. 169.
20 See Huertas and Cleveland, op. cit.
21 Steven Clarke's Central Banking Cooperation, 1924-31, New York, 
1967, provides a vivid account of the limits of that exercise.
22 See, on the subject, Marcello de Cecco, "Origins of the Post-War 
Payments System," in Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1979.
23 On the subject, see Albert O. Hirschman's classic work, National 
Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Berkeley, 1945.
2^ It can be gleaned from the Table "Estimates of American Holdings 
of Foreign Dollar Bonds," that by 1935, only less than 5 0 %  of foreign 
dollar bonds were still in American hands. There is evidence of many 
countries repurchasing their bonds on the American market at highly 
discounted prices. But they were also purchased by non-American private 
individuals and financial intermediaries, who had better hopes in their 
final redeemability than the American public.
25 in their work on America's experience as a creditor country, 




























































































operations were in the hands of an unofficial syndicate of London issuing 
houses, who controlled the issues very carefully. They contrasted this 
with the high numbers, and disorganized competition, of U.S. financial 
intermediaries involved in foreign lending. -According to a RIIA study, 
(quoted below), of L298 million British investments in foreign government 
bonds L100 million was in default in 1933. Of $7490 million foreign dollar 
bonds outstanding in 1935, 1810 million were in default.
26 The consideration that governments which attempted deflation and 
re-negotiation were soon replaced by revolutionary governments which 
repudiated debt is made by all contemporary writers on Interior Debt 
Problems. See, for instance, in addition to Madden, Nedler and Sauvain, 
C.R.S. Harris, Germany's Foreign Indebtdedness, London, 1935, R.I.I.A.,
The Problem of International Investment, London 1937, C. Lewis, America's 
Stake in International Investment, Washington, 1938, and H.B. Lary,
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T A B L E  2
Gold Reserves of Central Banks and Governments 
(Millions of $)
Total U.S. U.K France Germany Russia Austria Italy Japan
Hungary
1913 4859 1290 165 678 278 786 251 266 65
1921 8044 3221 754 690 237 212 610
1927 9593 3977 737 954 444 242 541
1928 10058 3746 748 1253 650 265 540
1929 10336 3900 709 1633 543 273 542
1933 12004 4011 928 3022 92 373 211






























































































324 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN DEPRESSION
and South America (except Argentina), which were principally agri­
cultural producing countries, maintained during these years a large 
export surplus, not to the United Kingdom, but to the industrial 
countries o f Europe and the United States, and Britain’s import sur­
plus arose chiefly out o f her trade with these industrial countries 
. rather than out o f trade with her larger debtors. Indeed, such coun- 
' tries as India, Australia, Brazil, China, and Japan had, more often 
! than not, a surplus o f imports from Great Britain, so that, not only 
! a part, but the whole o f their considerable service payments had to 
be met by means o f export surpluses to other countries.
United Kingdom: Import surplus and Income from Overseas Invest­






from  overseas 
investments
1913 . 145 ‘ 210
1922 . 176 175
1923 . ‘ 208 200
1924 . 337 220
1925 . 392 250
1926 . 463 250
1927 . 386 250
1928 . 352 250
1929 . 381 250
1930 . 386 220
1931 . 408 170
1932 . 287 150
1933 . 263 160
1934 . 294 175
1935 . 261 185
In terms o f goods, then, the interest on British overseas invest­
ments was paid by goods sent by the agricultural debtor countries to 
industrial Europe and the United States and passed on by these 
countries through exports o f manufactured goods to the United King­
dom. Apart o f the British import surplus arose, o f course, as the 
result o f direct trade with her debtors, but by far the largest part was 
the result o f triangular trade, and a part, at least, o f both the following 
quadrilateral routes: Agricultural debtors— Germany—other Euro­
pean countries— Great Britain; or, Debtors—United States— con­
tinental Europe— Great Britain.
In 1931 this system broke down, and it is interesting briefly to. 
trace the history o f its fail. In June 1928 the French franc was legally 
stabilized on a gold basis, and with the stabilization large short-term

































































































1923 Austrian Government Guaranteed Loan 33-6
1924 State Loan of the Kingdom of Hungary ' . 14-2
1924 Greek Government 7 per cent. Refugee Loan 12-2
1925 Municipality of Danzig 7 per cent. Mortgage Loan 1-5
1926 Kingdom of Bulgaria 7 per cent. Settlement Loan 3-4
1927 Free City of Danzig 6£ per cent. (Tobacco Monopoly)
State Loan . . . . . . . . 1-9
1927 Republic of Estonia 7 per cent. (Banking and Currency
Reform) Loan . . . . . . . 1-5
1923 Greek Government 6 per cent. Stabilization and Refugee
Loan . . . . . . . . . 7-5
1928 Kingdom of Bulgaria 7£ per cent. Stabilization Loan 5-4
T o t a l ........................................................................ 81-2
Creditors for League Loans*





France . 3 0












* League Loans Committee (London), Third Annual Report, June 1935, 
pp. 60 and 61.
I Secondly, they enabled the newly created states o f Europe to 
| attain that modicum of economic independence without which their 
political independence would have been an empty sham, and it 
enabled them to do this quickly, without any loss o f prestige, and 
in a manner compatible with the strongly nationalistic sentiments 
o f their inhabitants.
/  Thirdly, the League Loans involved several novel features which, 
I in the years before the depression, promised well for the furtherance 
' o f financial co-operation between nations. These features, some of 
. which were not entirely unknown before the war, were concomitants 
o f the existence o f any such extra-national body as the League




























































































TTTR CREDITORS—GREAT BRITAIN 153
British Overseas Investments in Quoted Securities, 1913,1930, and 1934
(£ millions)
1913* 1930» 1934«
Dominion and colonial governments 
Foreign governments 




Railways in other British countries 
United States railways .
Railways in other foreign countries
Railways
Electric light and power 
Gas \
Waterworks /
Tramways and omnibus . 
Telegraphs and telephones
Public utilities
Shipping . . . .  
Canals and docks .
Shipping, <Scc. .
Commercial and industrial 
Iron, coal, and steel 
Breweries . . . .







Banks and discount companies 
Financial, land and investment





























































































Total 3,763-3 3,424-6“-«j 3,414-0“ -*
•  Dp. Feis's estimates; cf. Europe, the World*a Banker, p. 27.
•  Sir Robert KindersleJr's estimates; cf. Economic Journal, June 1933.
•  Ibid.. Dec. 1938. The author very kindly allowed oa to see an advance copy o f tills article, so 
Uutt we might use his latest figures before going to press.
^ Owing to the preponderance of bearer snares it is not possible accurately to estimate the amount 
Of British-owned share capital In colonial and foreign railway, gas, and wsterwnrk companies. In 1930 
approximately £40 millions was invested in these tnree categories, and in 1934 approximately £13-d 





























































































THE CREDITORS— GREAT BRITAIN 157
prise within the Empire obtained its maximum amount o f capital 
in 1927, when £44 millions was issued on this account, and in foreign 
countries in 1922, when it. obtained £41 millions.1 Despite large 
fluctuations from year to year, only in 1929 and 1934 were the 
amounts raised by Empire governments not in excess o f any other 
class o f investment.










1923 . . 89-0 5-4 9-0 32-8 136-2
1924 . . 91-5 8-7 3-9 30-1 134-2
1925 . . 30-5 3-4 5-9 48-0 87-8
1926- . •. 46-7 9-3 7-6 48-8 112-4
1927 . . 63-6 13-2 11-3 50-6 138-7
1928 . . 57-7 14-1 13-7 57-9 143-4
1929 . . 30-4 4-3 12-3 47-3 94-3
1930 . . «5-8 2-7 15-3 25-0 108-8
1931 . . 30-7 3-9 11-5 46-1
1932 . . 24-6 1-0 1-3 2-3 29-2
1933 . . 30-21» 7-6» 37-8
1934 . . 11-0* 32-4° 43-4
* From League of Nations, Balance* o f Payment*. Excludes conversions.
* ‘ Public authorities’ .
* ‘ Private undertakings’ .
In his articles Sir Robert Kindersley has classified British commer­
cial capital abroad under two heads:
(1) Bonds and shares o f companies (as classified in the Stock Ex­
change Official Tear Book) operating entirely or mainly abroad 
and registered in the United Kingdom.
(2) Bonds and shares o f companies in overseas countries quoted 
and/or dealt in on the Stock Exchanges o f the United King­
dom but registered abroad.
Capital invested in companies falling within the first category—  
roughly designated ‘ British companies’—remains largely under 
direct British control. In the latter class, however, some concerns 
are ‘ virtually British-owned and controlled while in other instances 
British participation is insignificant, as, for example, in the case of 
American Railroad companies’.
In 1933 the volume of capital invested in British companies abroad
1 Economist figures.
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«  M *r-i ta 
>  °
~  Saih«M©ta










.2 o  
.5  "3
S)3ha9>
<-s o  I d  d .■J» -a  -33




G £«  -O> o
2  £  «  2
a s - S -  ;s  O« Vm
"°  5C3 *03
g  °2 ft
a c  N o o « c a o » « N n r t » o  3 g  o  *-« O  aq »o o  r»  «a 
"*3
a."!_ *r? g ^  ûOC5««OOCOfiO «Î NN•2 5» S  © O c* N N O o q q w q  





fa 3 - * i n - i c o N » a g










® -O* 3 
-k C SO
o 2
«  — O
s s :
■*“ 5  oS3 o d
•" d  sd J~ 3
a  - Id  c  > 
S O  %
•S • ffC3 03 Ci -a-» U
3  «  d
O § 32 h o -2 J- 3d o  co
>» 'a  -  C °  Sd î  2
G  8  ~
s  I ;3 -3
en ^  2  Q O -3
•a
3  «  
o  3  £  2
>6 «La G0
3  H 
3  32 O _
S e.2  d
d TS d  
-k C d  — a  -k2  3  d  
«  1 “  
J  > 5





tì I  WCQ tM
•a s  °.•s ï  d ft s  g»d  d «  
d  jB c
S S d
'd  d  „£
3 3 1
°  c  o  
0 5 3-k .3  ■»-d  3  2  °*»>S * 3
s  s  £  S -S
S s  S  2 . .  5  o  s  f f  5
1  «  Ë -  J
= I l  > d
u 2  S £  d 









^  o— La
o  sta >
Um go
o  .d







a— OWa  rs
C ̂  O o  
*£ enul «
<ha AJ
o  >_ kS d
.2 S
d  «La
S J :o  33dc 2o  .5«  d
J= -2
§  «  5
M .2 —*3 d  U.
s  5  2  «  d  w  s
JS O»-n «■■
O d
d  3 :  o  
ft
> .t»
>*1? k d k> k
3  «
5  °O je  d  —






i i  ^^  La«-a « C
— fa ^  ^  w
> S-d > •“  Z2 —
O










> 1  3  
d  O 33 d O B 




£  S>> ”32 S3d  m
d 5  
S cd  tu
•3  *d  
d■k O'
f t * "O «k-O o  os x






'E »  
» sn O1
l i r
2  O £  £=3r: »—1 -  «
— 03 .- O.û  ta
c 2
J2 ^  re «—  a  es —
-3  ^3
•a £^  S13- 3
7*AA-~-
:fc^vV .
■gui w' > ■■— «»>a»-a»»ai 1la — ■ a- >* ••--i» J—F7Ŝ-‘*-S*‘* "
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Source: Madden, Nadler, Souvain
TABLE 9
A P P E N D IX  II
STATUS OF ALL PUBLICLY OFFERED FOREIGN 
DOLLAR BONDS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1935





P aid  in  P u ll 
to
Dee. 3 1 .1 9 8 6
Inter a t  
in
D efault?









P rin cipal 
A lto  in  
D efault
In  D efault 
on Sinking  
Fund Only 
(Interest Be­
ing P aid )
*7 .1 3 9 4 0 0
Total Amount 
in  D efault 
(Sum  of 
Columns 












Chile.................................. « .0 8 9 ,0 0 0
Costa B i c a . .....................
C u b s...................................
Dominican R epu b lic .. .
3,128,500* 27415.800
16492,000
Gn>t«Tniil% „ , ....................
___  9,842,780
........... .............. . 295,549.830
14.449.000
91.286.000 





P *m m » . , , .............. .___  4,173,000
Total Latin A m erica. . .  289.S89.280 1400.651.930 150,632,640b 74,869,800 1,576,421,730
Europe:
A u stria ............................... ___  64.180,900
___ ____. . . . . . . , . , .  153,514,200
16,869400 16,869,500
Czechoslovakia................ 25.758.500 1,083.500 1,083,500
Danzig* Free C ity ...........___  3,885,000
D enm ark............................___  147,762.000 995,000 995,000
England.. . . ......................___  20,067,400
Estonia................................ 3,592,500




(S u n to / 
Column»
I  and V)




























I n n r IV V V I
In  D efault Total Amount Total Amount
Debt Service on Sinking in D efault O utstanding
P a id  in  F u ll Interest P rin cipal Fund Only (iSum of (Sum  o f
to in A lto in (Interest Be- Columns Columns
Country Dec. 31 .1936 D efault* D efault ing P aid ) I I  and IT ) I  and V)
_ Germany (including S a a r ) . « ,3 5 8 ,0 0 0 *883.587.310 *23,489.100 . . . . . . . . . $883,587.810 $886.945,810
28,942,500 20,942,500 26.942.500








75,000.000 75,000,000 75,000,000 75,000.000
S6.673.900 86.673,900 S6.673.900
Yugoslavia.............................. 6 3 4 2 4 4 0 0 63424.500 63.524.500






Jap an ........................................ . 368,457,700 368.457,700
Total F ar E aat.............. . 623.561,200 5.500 5,500.000 5400,000 629.061490
North America:
. 2,532.142,310 81419,800 416,500 81,219,800 2,613,362.110
Newfoundland....................... 5,164.000 5.164.000
Total North America . . 2.537,306410 81.219,800 413.500 81.219.S00 2,618426.110
Grand total.................... . $4,604.329490 S2.S09,892,340 $255,096,240s $74.869,800 $2,885.662,140 S7,4S9,991,530
•  Most issue* in default aa to interest are also in default aa to sinlcing fund. _  ,
i> Including J900.000 of bond* on which interest is being paid. This amount must be added to the amounts in Column* I and II in computing Columns 
V and VL
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l IO <» r» <
> C*3 i
i w3• oo
* *9 <I «O «N
NNNNQ0 O « C O N - * O - O
O P Î'V C Ç û O '-C O O -iO N O ^
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per headGross Net* Gross Net*
. (£ millions) £
1,350» 925 68 '49 20
1,330 955 56 38 127
817<* 753 36 ■ 34 . 122
660- 580 20 20 H
640 635 32 32 35
575 565 28 25 2
520 520 16» 16» 13
320 320 22 22 5
295 • 295 <*> (>) 74
260 260 15 15 34
260 50 12 2 4
250 250 11* 11* 64
234* 205 11 10 7 ------
200 200 8 8 11
*. 197» 189 9 9 128
143» 143 T 7 11-----
126J 94 5 4 45
120 80 5 3 1 8 -----
115 115 (1) (*) 17
115 115 6 6 13
94* 53 5 3 * 27
38 46 7 3 6
85 85 («) <‘> 9
SO 80 (‘ ) (l) 25
60 60 4 4 3
60 60 5 5 5
Country
Germany 

























* Major Source» : League of Nations, Balances o f Payment* ; Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders, Reports ; Statistical Yearbook* of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, India, and South A frica; Statistical Yearbooks of League of Nations; 
Staley, I7ar and the Private Investor, App. I ; South American Jotrmai ; llood y 's 
Manual of Investments ; Kimber’s Record of Government Debts.
b after deductions on account of each country’s investments abroad.
« Of which about £575 millions consisted of short-term capital.
« Of which short-term capital, £34 millions.
* These figures refer to 1932.
* These figures refer to only six months of 1930.
* Of which short-term capital, £71 millions.
» .. £25 .
1 ...........................
* „ £40
* » .. 223
i No accurate estimate can be made because a large part of the foreign 





























































































menta; bat for a number o f countries about which less information is 
available, only the debts o f central governments have been included. 
Reparations are excluded, but war and relief debts are included. 
These figures must be regarded as little more than approximations, 
like those already put forward in this chapter.
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as percentage of 
total public 
debt
Germany '  260 20
Canada . 270 20 25
Australia . 599 73 52
China 36 13 75
Argentina 240 38 36
390 68 44
Brazil . 166 32 61
Dutch East Indies 99 31
Cuba 30 11 64
South Africa . 161 62 63
Japan . 192 74 24
Chile SO 32 85
Poland . 90 38 90
Roumania 157 78 91
New Zealand . 159 31 57
Hungary 55 38 36
Norway . 42 33 50
Austria . 60 50 90
Peru 22 19 70
Denmark 32 34 55
Czechoslovakia 51 35 19
Colombia 30 35 68
Venezuela nil nil nil
Uruguay 30 50 ••
Sources : See note to table on p. 22£
Despite the nature o f much o f the material on which it is based, 
the table serves to emphasize the magnitude o f the sums lent to 
debtor governments. In certain cases 3uch as Australia, India, Japan,! 
fend New Zealand, over two-thirds o f the imported capital has been; 
for the use o f public authorities. Only in a few cases has a large* 
part o f the investment not been in government bonds; Cuba, China, 
and Venezuela may be particularly mentioned. Those countries ! 
which have not financed the major part o f their government debts 
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which came from them must have originated in other European 
countries such as France, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden.









Ï Ï .S A  - . . 1,405 1,738 3,143 26-3
Great Britain 386 1,167 2,053 17-2-
Holland 263 1,806 2,069 17-3
Switzerland . 236 1,642 1,878 15-7
Other countries 138 2,638 2,326 23-5
Total . . . . 2,978 • 8,991 11,969» 100-0
* The Economist, Reparations and W ar Debts Supplement, 23 Jan. 1932, 
p. 11, quoted by Harris, op. cit., p. 9.
» Approximately £535 millions (Rm . 20-43 =  £1).
As the table on p. 237 shows, the United States was also Germany’s 
largest creditor on long-term, with Holland and Great Britain 
second and third. Over half o f all the foreign long-term loans to 
Germany during the period 1924 to 30th June 1931 were floated in 
the United States.
How these vast imports o f capital affected the balance o f Ger­
many’s foreign payments is shown in the following consolidated 
balance of payments for the years 1924-30 inclusive:
The German Balance o f Payments 1924-30»
Current account:
Merchandise . . . . .
Em. millions 
. -  6,224
Shipping and other services . +  2,928
Armies of occupation, Ac. . . - f  907
Interest payments . . . . . -  2,723
Reparations payments . -10 ,146
Balance on current account . -15 ,263»
Capital account:
Long-term loans and bonds repurchased . +  7,174
Movements of securities . +  1,008
Other German investments abroad (net) . +  698»
Short-term capital movements . . +  4,756
Indefinable capital movements . . 4- 3,734»
Balance of capital movem ents. . +17,370
Gold and foreign exchange . -  2,107
Balance on capital account . +15,263
* Calculated from estimates given in the Sonder he ft zu Wirtschafl und 
Statistic, No. 14, 1934.
» £745 millions (Rm . 20-43 =» £1).
« This is accounted for by the repatriation of pre-war investments in the U.3JL
* Includes Rm. 1,200 millions of United States bank-notes exported in 1924 
and 1925.
it
































































































Continental group and countrykm* end of 1937 1923 1928
(OOO.OOO'l) (000,000's) 1928 new % 1935 1938 1928 new 3 1935 1938
gold gold
2,125.49 WnrIH T n fa l__________ __________________I..................... 35,482 40,088 21,042 24,533 33,615 55,222 19,025 23,917
154.17
34.91
AT9Tf!A_______  . ................................- ----- - 1,613 2,734 1,373 *1-564 1,305 2,210 1,022 *1,021
656 1,118 547 498 576 977 473 417




French Territories: 198 335 189 143 165 280 174 162
79 134 76 61 50 85 41 43
66 112 82 45 48 82 51 39
Italian Territories:
13 170.85 (












............. G 16 27 13 10 23 39 19 17_> — — — — —
15 26 9 6 4 7 4 2





454 764 440 577 373 460 190 236
British Nyaaaiand..................................................................... 4 7 3 4 4 6 3 5
11 19 14 25 4 * / 23 49
32 55 27 41 19 32 14 24
South-West Africa (p»*nd.)........... ............ ........................... 14 23 7 12 16 27 12 17
391 662 385 491 227 385 135 138







583 855 366 491 457 773 359 348
Belgian Territories:
45 76 19 35 32 54 33 50
1 2 1 2 1 1 - 1 2


















3 5 1 2 3 5 1 1
4 7 2 1 3 9 2 1
54 92 36 36 63 106 33 30
41 70 24 34 32 54 32 38




76 129 37 41 82 140 35 46
s 14 5 7 8 13 6 10
16 23 13 15 IS ' 31 15 15
5 8 3 4 5 9 3 3
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1








8 6 6 6
9 15 11 8 6 10 12 7








56 94 44 47 45 i6 43 33








14 8 •8 \
7 12 •35 / U 2 \ 2 4 2 l
...............G *4 •6 •2 •3 • l •2 n *2
Portarti ese Territories:
19 10 13 21 10 151-26 3.23
- 0.16
11 7










22 37 13 22 17 29 10 8
2 3 l t 2 4 1 1





•1 •2 • i •1 •3 •5 •3 •2
AM ERICA................................................................................... 8310 14,411 4^65 4,936 9.802 14,597 4,963 6,048
5,791 9,806 2.548 3,011 6,618 11,204 3,092 4,027
1-222 2.070 2.552 676 1-364 2w09 738 845




I t 1 l 2 4 1 2
27 46 20 23 34 58 27 32
4.078 6.904 2.039 1.950 5.029 8.515 2.2*3 3.057
336 569 152 243 135 229 51 55











2.714 4,605 1,417 1.925 3,184 5,391 1,371 2,021
647 1.130 437 673 904 1,531 668 834
12 20 9 11 15 25 10 12
23 38 IS 26 41 70 37 35
146 247 61 103 236 400 96 139




3.00 16 27 9 to 18 31 10 10
0.04 2 4 3 2 l 2 l 1
19.32 Mexico, as recorded....................................... 168 285 104 110 243 411 147 110
17 29 12 13 — •
For footnotes, see pete 101.


































































































end of 1937 
(000,000* •)











L atin  A m erica (con tin u ed)
M in eral Producing C oun trice  (con tinued)
Netherlands Territories:
— 0M Curacao.........................................................................C i n 188 118 •214 104 176 ICS •180
0.16 a i7 Surinam __. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 4 4 5 8 3 3
1.25 7.10 Peru..... .............. ................ ................................................... 70 119 44 39 125 212 75 76
0.91 333 Venezuela, aa recorded............................... ........................ 73 124 41 95 116 196 1*1 26*
Adjustment for freight. etc............................................ 8 13 5 11 — —
1Û.4Â 70.3* 1,132 1,917 582 734 1,125 1,904 618
LSI 43.25 Brazil................................................................................ G ’441 747 226 296 474 ’803 272 296
British Terri tone»:
0.06 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 2
0.06 1.13 31 53 25 32 20 34 18 24
0.46 24 41 21 35 28 47 20
0.65 34 58 25 30 16
8.60 161 273 65 89 128 217 70
0.06 0.61 Costa R ica ................. ..................................................... G 18 30 7 13 19 32 7 9
a u 4.2Q G213 G3 60 G  95 G106 278 471 128 142
Adjustment for freight. etc............................................ 21 36 n 13
0.05 139 27 45 10 11 29 49 16 18
Adjustment for freight. etc................... ........................ 3 5 i 1
0.03 1.66 £2 Salvador......................................................................G 18 31 9 9 24 41 h 10_ 036 Guadeloupe and Martinique (French).......... .................. 15 25 16 14 17 29 22 17
0.11 3.00 Guatemala.............................................................................. G31 C52 G12 G21 28 47 12 16
0.01 2.60 H aitit.......................................... ............. ............................ 20 33 8 8 22 37 7 7
a u 1.00 Honduras, as recordedt................................................G 12 21 10 11 22 37 9 6
1 2 1 1 __ _
o u i 0.90 Nicaragua, aa recorded........................................................ 14 23 5 5 12 20 5 4
Adjustment for freight, etc............................................ 1 2 1 1 — _ —— _
0.0S 0-55 Panama, as recorded..................................................... ... 15 26 14 14 4 7 4 4
Adjustment for freight, e t c . .......................................... 2 3 2 2 — — mam
— 0.04 Panama Canal Zone..................................................... G •28 •47 •17 •21 •2 «3 •1 • l
3.46 15.8* N on -T ropical A gricu ltu ral C o u n trie s.......................... 92* 1.558 398 516 1.158 1,956 58* 510
2.79 12.76 Argentina............................................................................... 807 1.367 340 443 1,018 1,723 501 43*
0.02 Falkan Islands (British)..................................................... 3 5 1 1 20 35 2 2
0.46 0.95 Paraguay................................................................................ 13 23 9 10 15 26 9 9
0.19 2.09 Uruguay4.......................................................................... 97 163 4 * 62 102 172 76 61
36.96 1,101.53 A SIA ................................................................................................ 4,837 8,19* 2.9*7 3,3*6 5,026 8,509 3,004 3,337
6.99 396.41 In d ia , B u rm a an d  C eylon................................................ 1,061 1,796 594 5*7 1.356 2^95 678 733
4.27 367.35 India*...................................................................................... 337 1.418 459 467 1,084 1.835 510 554
0.61 15.30 Burma*................................................................................... 75 127 49 38 123 208 74 79
0.07 3.56 Ceylon..................................................................................... 139 235 81 35 137 232 85 96
0.30 French India............. ................................................... ... G 4 6 8 2 10 17 8 30.60 6 10 6 5 *9 3 l 1
3.33 125.73 So u th -E ast A sia .......... ......................................................... 1,344 2,197 *77 861 1.521 2,576 911 1,060
British Territories:
British Borneo:
0.0* 0-30 British North Borneo............................................ G 3 8 3 4 6 11 4 5— 0.03 B ru n e i.............................................................. .......... 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 4
0.11 0.60 Sarawak................................... ........................ ..... .G 12 21 9 13 •19 •33 11 14
a u 5.14 British M a la y a . . . . . .............................................. G 493 835 270 314 482 817 329 326
a 7 4 23.55 French Indo China.................... ......................................... 100 169 60 55 115 195 S6 81
1.91 67.40 Netherlands Indies.............................................................. 403 683 188 268 634 1,073 320 379
0-30 13.60 133 226 85 131 154 260 93 115
Adjustment for freight, etc............................................ 16 27 13 20
0.02 0.46 Port. Timor....................... ................. ................................ •1 •t — •1 1 emm —•
0 J2 14.65 Thailand_______ ___________________ 80 135 48 55 109 185 66 76
0.4* 100.92 Ja p a n , K orea, F o rm o sa ..................................................... 1,971 1.514 742 79* 917 1,553 735 817
0.42 71.84 Japan (with Sakhalin)9....................................................... 990 1.677 700 750 386 1401 708 758
0.22 23.64 Korea*............................................................................... G 54 92 29 37 15 25 18 48
0.04 5.44 Formosa*...........................................................................G 27 45 13 11 16 27 9 11
16.61 491.46 China an d  O ther C on tin en tal A siatic C o u n trie s .. . 1,461 2.473 974 1,164 1,232 2,0*5 680 7*7
0.65 7.00 Afghanistan.......................................................................... G 11 •19 •10 •13 12 •21 •11 •71
2.40 7.12 Arabia.................................................................................... G 31 •53 •21 •25 14 *23 15 22
British Territories: •
— 0.07 Aden.................................................................................. G t29 149 724 26 724 740 714 13— 0-37 Cyprus......................................... .......................................... 8 14 6 11 7 12 5 12
0.12 1.70 33 56 38 56 8 14 22 28
9.80 414.66 China, excluding Manchuria7................................................ 706 1.193 340 261 482 816 208 153
1-30 37.09 Manchuria (with Kwantung) r........................................... 153 259 172 343 229 388 107 171— — Hong Kong................................................................................ 318 538 176 187 257 •435 131 155
1.64 15.00 Iran.............................................................................................. 176 7129 •56 •92 7153 7259 •120 •130
Q3Q 3.67 34 *58 34 46 20 *34 •27 •39
Macao (Portuguese)................................................................ •u •18 9 8 •3 •8 5 6
020 3.60 Syria and Lebanon (French mand.)___, ............................ 51 87 3 * 36 21 35 15 17
21.1* 169. a* U .S .S .R ......................................................................................... 491 831 219 268 413 699 326 287 ,
6.16 412.0* EUR O PE........................................................................................ 19,199 32,356 11.64* *13,481 15,139 25.633 9,056' •10,47*
For footnote», see pate 101.


































































































end of 1937 
(000.000‘s)
• Imports - Exports
Cod linen tal (reap and country
1928
1928 







EUROPE (con tin u—1)
5.68
























11.392 19,288 6.873 8,065
9,159 15.508 sjas 6.173
•289 311 526 169 •178
889 1.506 625 765 857 1.451 572 724
567 960 281 292 627 1.061 309 354
2,097 3.551 1.393 1-322 2.041 3,456 1.026 876














^  Italy......................................................................................... 1.173 1.986 644 586 783 1J2Ó 434 547
1.078 1.826 635 776 786 1.331 458 568
458 775 375 523 422 715 330 463







2,169 2,233 3,780 1,398 1.895
3 5 2 3







441 746 282 354 414 701 267 335
0.05 35 59 19 29 34 58 22 23
0 J 9
0.13

















0.09 211 358 118 122 144 244 133 155
0.Î4 Italian "  T*i**»<4«......................................................... •1 •1 5 8 •t •1 •1 1
0.07 1.97
2^5
59 101 33 44 50 85 32 44
0.05 29 49 22 38 25 43 26 39
0.27 M alta................................................................ .................... 19 32 19 19 2 3 1 1190' 0.32 2.91
34.92
269 456 202 290 179 303 148
0-39 377 638 163 247 281 476 176 22549
1540.09 7.38 120 203 103 101
43 73 39
0-30 19.65 195 331 97 137 161 273 146
0.50 24.44 580 982 286 •152 409 692 190 •98
0.76 16.80 114 193 71 119 89 150 77 1151170.23 15.40
58.62
0.03





3,619 4,374 3,747 6,345 2,183 2,410
2 2 4 2 213
1160.10 0.12 17 29 10 11 21
36 11













8-53 10.17 OCEANIA...................................................................................... 920 1.558 559 772 930 1,574 654 7745187.71 6.87 657 1.113 376 508 625 1,060 447
12 21 13 12 — — —
0.03 0.10
British Territories:
1 2 . 1 1 2 3 i 1
0.02 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.02 0.20 7 11 5 7 12 21 7
0.04 1 2 1 1 2 3 1__ 1 2 1 1 2 3 2

















« » 0.06 1 2 1 i 2 3 1
0.05
French Territories:
2 4 2 2 2 3 2 1
0.02 0.06 7 11 4 5 4 7 4 10.01 0.05 2 3 . 1 1 2 3 1
0.02 1 1 1 1 — —- 175 225<U7 1.60 213 360 141 216 262 444
5 8 1 — — —-
_ 0.11 2 4 4 6 4 7
0.01 — — • — *—
•  Wholly or partly estimated.
t Years other than calendar.
(G) General trade. .  . . .
1 Union of South Africa: including Basutoland, Bcchuanaland, and Swaziland which form part of the customs area ox tne 
Union of South Africa.
•  Greenland, area: part free from ice.
•  United States: including Alaska, Hawaii. Porto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands, which form part of the customs 
area of the United States.
4 Uruguay: imports: 1938 is “real values"; 1928 and 1935 are “ official values”  (The official value in 1938 was 43).
•  India, Burma: “ sea-borne trade only.’* Trade between India and Burma is excluded.
•  Japan, Korea, Formosa: excluding trade of Koifea, Formosa, and Japan with one another.
•  China: excluding trade between Manchuria and the rest of China.
•A ustria: trade with Germany in 1938 (not shown in trade returns) was estimated—probably on the low side—on the basis 
of data for the preceding years and included.
•Germany, France: The Saar (500 km*, 0.S million Inhabitants) was Included In the French customs area until 17 Febru­
ary 1935 inclusive.
» Germany: trade with Austria in 1938 (not shown in trade returns) was estimated—probably on the low side—on the basis 
of data for the preceding years and included.
u  Switzerland: in 1935 and 1938 including improvement and repair trade, excluded in 1928, viz.: imports 12^ and 10.6; 
exports 15.4 and 13-3.
u  United Kingdom: excluding trade with the Channel Islands.
Source: League of Nations,
Geneva, 1942



























































































T A B L E  16
2S8 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN DEPRESSION
• that it did not enable production to be directed quickly into more 
profitable channels. Those suffered least which could develop other 
industries, and, by means of tariff barriers, reduce imports in order 
to retain a favourable export balance.




Union of South Africa . 30-7
Brazil . 30-6
British M alaya. . 28-9
Australia. . 26-3
Canada . . 25-1
The principal difficulties o f debtors have been caused by changes in 
relative prices, and it is therefore necessary to examine at this point 
the nature o f the falls in commodity prices during the depression.
Decline in Average Gold Export Prices, 1929-34•
per cent.
1. Raw silk (Japan) . . 84
2. Copper (United States) . 75
3. Batter (Denmark) . . 73
4. W heat (United States) . 71
5. Grey cotton tissues (Japan) . 68
6. Petrol (United States) . . 68
7. Coffee (Brazil) . . .6 8
8. Rubber (British Malaya) . 66
9. Newsprint paper (Canada) . 65
10. Maize (Argentina) . . 65
11. Silk tissues (France) . . 64
12. Cotton (United States). . 63
13. Chilled beef (Argentina) . 61
14. Mechanical wood-pulp (Fin­
land) . . . .5 1
per cent.
15. W ool (Argentina) . . 57
16. Sugar (Czechoslovakia) . 57
17. White cotton piece-goods
(U .K .) . . . .5 4
18. Cement (Germany) . . 54
19. Passenger motor-cars (U .SA .) 53
20. Bacon ^Denmark) . . 52
21. Tea (Ceylon) . . .4 8
22. Pig-iron (U .K .) . . .4 7
23. Coal (U .K .) . . .3 9
24. Steel girders (Belgium) . 36
25. Tin (British Malaya) . . 32
26. Mowing machines (Germany) 14
• League of Nations, Review o f World Trade, 2934, pp. 14-15.
Price falls were very irregular, but were most marked in the case 
of raw materials exported by agricultural countries and o f food, 
j Export prices o f raw materials (such as coal and pig-iron) exported 
by industrial countries, o f most manufactured articles o f consump­
tion, and of various capital goods have been much firmer. The gold 
prices o f all raw materials and semi-manufactured goods entering 
into international trade fell between 1929 and 1934 by 60 per cent., 
, foodstuffs by 58 per cent., and manufactured articles by 50 per cent.
i The discrepancies between the price movements of articles enter­ing into international trade caused the imports o f agricultural countries 
to become more expensive in terms o f their exports. In other words,




























































































INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN DEPRESSION 291
Germany's Balance of Trade, 1927-25
(Hm. million»)
Tsar Export!* Imports* Balance0
1927 . 10,801 14,228 -3 ,4 27
1928 . 12,055 14,051 -1 ,9 9 6
1929 . 13,483 13,447 +  36
1930 . 12,036 10,393 +  1,643
1931 . , . 9,599 6,727 +  2,372
1932 . 5,739 4,667 +  1,072
1933 . 4,871 4,204 +  667
1934 . 4,167 4,451 — 284
1935* 4,270 4,159 +  111
* Exports of domestic produce.
* Imports for home consumption.
* Excess of exports ( + ) ,  of imports ( —).
d Including the Saar territory from 18 Feb. 1935.
This decline in exports was arrested only in 1935, and the conse­
quent difficulty o f obtaining foreign exchange has had most serious 
effects on the German economic system. Supplies o f gold have 
gradually diminished and there has been an acute shortage o f certain 
raw materials and foodstuffs. It appears that these difficulties are, 
for the moment, being overcome; but they are far from completely 
solved. Their ultimate solution may result in the creation within 
Germany o f industries for the production o f goods formerly imported 
on such a scale as to injure materially the export industries o f both 
raw material producers and the two great creditor countries.1
Australia, whose difficulties were also very great, has met the ser­
vice on her public external debt in frill, but only by rigid deflation and 
control o f imports. Trouble began in 1929 with the cessation o f new 
lending and the simultaneous fall in the prices o f Australia’s exports. 
Prior to this, Australia had been borrowing continuously from abroad, 
chiefly from Great Britain, and this had sufficed to pay for an import 
surplus and the interest due on past loans. Wheat and wool prices 
had, however, been well maintained, and Australian governments 
had been induced by the resultant wave o f prosperity to spend con­
siderably more than they received in taxes. The deficits o f the Com­
monwealth and State governments in 1929-30 amounted to about 
£1 15s. per head o f the population. Before equilibrium could be 
restored, these deficits had to be wiped out, and imports reduced 
relatively to exports. In order to achieve this, the following measures
i 1
1 See below, pp. 323-7, for a discussion of bow German import restrictions 
have influenced the ability of other debtors to make the service payments due 
to Great Britain.




























































































A P P E N D IX  IV
STATUS OF INTEREST PAYMENTS ON DEFAULTED 






in Cash and Part Payment 
Scrip or Offered 
Funding Bonds in Cash
. . .  369,372,900 3 12,059,500
Payment Offered
in Scrip or Payment Offered 










Brazil........................... . . .  _____. . . . .  318,495,800
CThil#» ...................................
Colombia............................
Oxrtft Rica, . . . .................. 38,781,000
Cuba,........ ........................ 74,970,700






Panama...... „ ........................ . . .  11,351,500 .................
Peru....... .
TJrugu&y........................ ...........................  52,947,500






































Total North America..............................................................................................................  81,219,800
Grand Total.......................  380,724,400 S615,037,900 38,781,000 350,269,300 32,055,079,740
» Based on treatment of la st  interest coupon m atured during 1935.
»  Interest is being deposited in reichsm arks by m ost Germ an issuers but is not available to bondholders. 
e Payable up to 5 per cent per annum.
Total Amount 




























































































































A P P E N D IX  VI
ESTIMATES OF AMERICAN HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN 
DOLLAR BONDS AT THE END OF 1935
( i n  THOUSANDS 0 7  d o l l a r s )
Estimated












National Government. .3 241,577 55 3132,867 3 108,710
■ Political subdivisions .. 109,581 20 21,916 87,665
Total......................... 351,158 44 154,783 196,375
Bolivia.............................. 59,422 17 10,101 49,321
Brazil:
National Government.. 144,873 15 21,701 122,972
Political subdivisions .. 201,957 20 40,391 161,566
Corporations................. 2,610 15 392 2,218
Total......................... 349,240 18 62,484 286,756
Chile................................. 307,991 15 46,199 281,792
Colombia:
Government and Mort­
g a g e  hanks................ 61,492 40 24,597 38,895
Others........................... 94,596 15 14,139 80,407
Total......................... 156,088 25 38,786 117,302
Costa Rica........................ 8,781 15 1,317 7,464
Cuba................................. 123,837 10 12,384 111,453
Dominican Republic........ 16,292 10 1,629 14,663
El Salvador...................... 12,619 45 5,678 6,941
Hirntpm a Ia ................................ 22214 10 221 1,993
Haiti................................. 9,343 10 984 8,859
Mexico.............................. 295,550 70 206,885 88,665
Paniim A  ............................... 18,622 40 7,449 11,173
Peru.................................. 91,286 30 27,386 63,900
Uruguay........................... 63,368 34 21,545 41,823
Total Latin America.31,866,311 32.0 3597,331 $1,268,480
(Table continued, on nest page.)
r




























































































A P P E N D IX  V
PAYMENTS ON DEFAULTED INTEREST COUPONS 
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1931, TO 
DECEMBER 31, 1935
( i n c l u d e s  o n l y  i s s u e s  d e f a u l t e d  s i n c e  JA N U A BY  1, 1931, AND 
OUTSTANDING ON DECEMBEB 31, 1935)
Payment
Offered
Payment in Scrip No
Offered or Funding Payment











. . .  9,466,480 29,884,550
Colombia.........
Costa Rica. . . .















































$30,176,890 $44,147,180 $235,717,240 $310,041,310
$ 1,498,200 ..............$ 2,578,210 $ 4,076,410
..................................  86,680 86,680
.......................................................... 179,100 179,100
24,288,450 $27,013,170 79,002,320 130,303,940
2,019,000 ......  4.364,200 6,383,200
511,490 ......  13,094,120 13,605,610
574,250 ......  957,080 1,531,330
.......................................................... 15,167,930 15,167,930
1,616,770 12,497,020 2,311,590 16,425,380
Total E urope... $30,508,160 539,510,190 5117,741,230 51S7,759,580 
North America:
Canada........................................................... $ 17,432,080 $ 17,432,OSO
Total North
America...................................................  17,432,080 17,432,080
Grand total.......  $60,685,050 $83,657,370 $370,890,550 5515,232.970
314




























































































ESTIMATES OF AMERICAN HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN 
DOLLAR BONDS AT THE END OF 1935 (Continued)
( i n  t h o u s a n d s  o f  d o l l a b s )
Estimated
Amount Estimated Estimated Amount
Reported Percentage Amount Held in the
Out- Held Held United
Country standing Abroad Abroad State*
Europe:
Austria........................ . . . $  64,181 85 S 54,554 $ 9,627
Belgium...................... . . .  153,514 68 104,389 49,125
Bulgaria...................... 16,870 35 5,904 10,966
Czechoslovakia........... 28,842 70 18,789 8,053
Danzig...................... . 3,885 30 1,166 2,719
rVnrmirlc..................... . . .  148,757 30 44,627 104,130
Rn irlanH ...................... . . .  20,067 20,067
Estonia....................... 3 5̂92 ÌÒ 359 3,233
Finland............ . . . .  40,931 40 16,372 24,559
France......................... 85 115,313 20,350
^^•Germany..................... . . .  886,946 40 354,778 532,168
Greece......................... 26,943 50 13,472 13,471
Hungary............... 56,906 50 28,453 28,453
Irish Free State.......... 1,332 , . 1,332
Italy............................ . . .  21S,045 50 109,022 109,023
Luxemburg................. 8,000 50 4,000 4,000
Netherlands................ 70,161 75 52,621 17,540
Norway....................... . . .  158,072 35 55,325 102,747
Poland........................ 99,249 40 39,700 59,549
Rumania..................... 10,938 10 1,094 9,844
Russia......................... 75,000 10 7,500 67,500
Sweden....................... 86,674 25 21,669 65,005
Yugoslavia.................. 63,525 50 31,763 31,762
Total Europe. . . . . . .  2,376,093 45.5 1,080,870 1,295,223
Far East:
Australia..................... . . .  255,103 60 153,062 102,041
fr in ii,........................ 5,500 5,500
Japan.......................... . . .  368,458 60 221,075 147,383
Total Far E ast... . . .  629,061 59.5 374,137 254,924
North America:
Canada....................... . . .  2,613,362 50 1,306,681 1,306,882
Newfoundland............ 5,164 10 516 4,648
Total North America. 2,818,527 49.9 1,307,197 1,311,330
Grand Total........ . .  .37,489,992 44.9 $3,360,035 $4,129,957
316
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